Which is why it’s a good idea to keep the threshold between conventional and nuclear war as high as possible-and why the low-yield Trident warhead is a bad idea. Things spiral out of control pretty quickly. But no one in officialdom has ever played a war game in which a “limited” attack believably stays limited. If war happens and if nuclear weapons come into the fray, clearly it’s sensible to try to keep the damage limited.
In fact, the dynamic unleashed-the near-certainty of a retaliatory strike, followed by another round of strikes, steadily subsumed in the fog of war, as communications systems burn out, commanders wander in confusion about what’s going on, each side fears the worst from the other and seeks to preempt the next blow with a blow of his own-would mean that before too long, the conflict escalates to catastrophe. That is the real danger of the low-yield weapon-not so much the weapon itself (especially compared with much higher-yield weapons) but the deception that the whole concept plants in a decision-maker’s mind: the idea that “low-yield” means tiny, harmless, controllable. (That’s the scariest answer of all.) The point is, as the Obama NSC’s war game spelled out, nobody knows how it would, or should, be used-and certainly nobody knows what might happen next. Some say the president would make the decision. Some say, no, that would escalate the conflict it would be aimed at a target on the battlefield. Some say it would be aimed at a target inside Russia. Where would this weapon be aimed? I’ve asked several officials who deal with these matters.
No one in officialdom has ever played a war game in which a “limited” attack believably stays limited.
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